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Loss ofControl In Flight (LOC-I) is themost lethal type of accident in recent aviation history
and the one that has experienced the least reduction in the past 20 years. These, combined
with recent accidents such as Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian Flight 302, help explain the attention
dedicated by several aviation stakeholders to prevent it from happening. Prior to that, however,
the understanding of the characteristics of the phenomenon is of paramount importance.
Pilots, aircraft and systems are deeply related in LOC-I accidents, but current definitions tend
to examine these in isolation and not as a human-in-the-loop system. Following experiments
in a flight simulator with a group of test pilots, this paper investigates the use of the Cooper-
Harper rating scale and the Quantitative Loss of Control Criteria to assess controllability
in a series of manoeuvres performed in four different sets of LOC-I test scenarios. The
experimental design, including the selection of pilots, adaptation of test scenarios, conception
of tasks and data gathering procedure, is thoroughly discussed. From a statistical correlation
analysis, results indicate the existence of a positive weak to moderate monotonic relationship
between the qualitative and quantitative approaches, however the resemblance of events indeed
impacting on controllability issues is low. Finally, a discussion is taken on ways to conceive
tasks with regard to the application of the Cooper-Harper scale and the possibility of adapting
the quantitative method, both in the sense of beingmore faithful to the actual aircraft condition
and pilots’ workload.
Nomenclature
퐴퐴 = Adverse Aerodynamics
퐶퐹퐼푇 = Controlled Flight Into Terrain
퐶퐺 = Centre of Gravity
퐷푂퐹 = Degree of Freedom
퐷푃퐶 = Dynamic Pitch Control
퐷푅퐶 = Dynamic Roll Control
퐺푆 = Glideslope
퐻푅퐶 = High-Risk Accident Occurrence Categories
퐻푄푅 = Handling Qualities rating, in this case, Cooper-Harper rating
퐼퐿푆 = Instrument Landing System
퐼푄푅 = Interquartile Range
퐾푇푆 = knots
퐿퐷퐺 = Landing Gear
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퐿푂퐶 − 퐼 = Loss of Control in Flight
퐿푂퐶 = Localizer
푀퐿푊 = Maximum Landing Weight (lbs)
푛 = Vertical load factor
푁 = Sample size
푂퐸퐼 = One Engine Inoperative
푃퐹퐷 = Primary Flight Display
푃퐼퐷 = Proportional-Integral-Derivative
푃퐼푂 = Pilot Induced Oscillation
푄퐿퐶 = Quantitative Loss of Control Criteria
푟푆 = Spearman correlation coefficient
푆퐼 = Structural Integrity
푈퐴 = Unusual Attitude
푉퐹퐸 = Maximum operating equivalent airspeed for flaps up (kts)
푉푀푂 = Maximum operating equivalent airspeed for flaps down (kts)
푉푅퐸퐹 = Reference Speed (kts)
푉푆푊 = Stall warning equivalent airspeed in 1-g flight (kts)
훼 = Angle of attack (deg)
훼푆푊 = Angle of attack for stall-warning activation (deg)
훽 = Sideslip angle (deg)
훽푀퐷푋푊 = Sideslip angle for a non-crabbed approach in the maximum demonstrated crosswind for takeoff or
landing (deg)
휃 = Pitch angle (deg)
휃 ′ = Dynamic pitch attitude (deg)
¤휃 = Pitch rate (deg per second)
휙 = Bank angle (deg)
휙′ = Dynamic roll attitude (deg)
¤휙 = Roll rate (deg per second)
I. Introduction
With increasing numbers of air passengers and competition, the challenge of maintaining safe and affordable airtravel has never been greater. Based on the concept of HRC [1], two events highlighted: CFIT and LOC-I. The
first consists of the collision of a completely under control aircraft with terrain, whilst the second is characterised by
situations in which both the crew and the autoflight systems are incapable of controlling the aircraft flight path [2].
Despite being relatively uncommon, either type almost invariably results in deaths: from 2012 to 2016, 84% of CFIT
occurrences were fatal, whilst 90% of LOC-I accidents yielded in casualties [3]. In the past two decades, however,
CFIT experienced a significant reduction in its rate mainly due to the advent and diffusion of ground proximity warning
systems [4], since the accident is typically associated with the approach phase (Fig. 1)∗. On the other hand, LOC-I
accidents permeate all phases of flight (Fig. 1) and the development of LOC-I-oriented prevention defences faces
profound difficulties, so deep that the industry has not incorporated a widespread technology for the mitigation of this
type of event [8].
Recent and highly publicised accidents, such as Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian Flight 302, show that the introduction
of systems that inadvertently intervene in the human-machine interaction trying, for example, to avoid potential LOC-I
precursors, like stall, may end up consolidating the accident instead of effectively helping. Mitigation of LOC-I events
is currently a common aim amongst the major aviation stakeholders [3, 4, 9–12] and society urges for an issue softening,
however LOC-I occurrences are highly complex and the latest events demonstrate that a clearer and more comprehensive
understanding of these accidents is vital for the successful development and implementation of defences [13]. Being
LOC-I, a dynamics and control problem involving the human-systems integration [2], it must be investigated from the
∗Data are retrieved from IATA annual Safety Reports – [3, 5–7]
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Fig. 1 CFIT and LOC-I percentage distribution per phase of flight (period: 2009 to 2016).
perspective of pilots and aircraft.
This paper seeks to examine the correlation between human perception and aircraft behaviour in potential LOC-I
conditions. To assess the human point of view, the Cooper-Harper handling qualities rating scale is used, as its higher
ratings foresee controllability threatening [14]; on the other hand, the Quantitative Loss of Control Criteria provides
information in the aircraft perspective by the observation of key aircraft variables in LOC-I events [15]. The analysis
is based on pilot-in-the-loop experiments conducted in a full-flight simulator with different human pilots. Section II
details the Cooper-Harper scale and the QLC, meanwhile the simulator equipment, task definition, experiment setup
and evaluation procedure are presented in Section III. Subsequently, qualitative and quantitative simulation results are
analysed in Section IV and the correlation between these is discussed. Concluding remarks are finally provided.
II. Assessing controllability
Controllability is a matter of fundamental importance for the aeronautical industry simply due to the fact that,
without control, aircraft are back to the beginning of the 20th in which ingenious solutions were proposed and tested to
make it humanly flyable, unfortunately, sometimes with the worst consequences. Nowadays, after years of development
in aviation and with increasing levels of automation within the cockpit, controllability is still vogue, but now especially
focused in the perspective of the human-aircraft interaction. As difficult as it can be, the assessment of controllability is
vital not only for aircraft certification purposes, but also to understand LOC-I events and promote safety enhancements.
Due to the characteristics of LOC-I occurrences, independent mechanisms used to derive information about aircraft
controllability are selected: (i) the Cooper-Harper Handling Quality Rating Scale, to address the human being qualitative
point of view, and (ii) the Quantitative Loss of Control Criteria, geared towards the aircraft itself and representing a
quantitative approach. For what follows, these are detailed.
A. The Cooper-Harper rating scale
Controllability, in the human pilot viewpoint, may be understood as the capacity to maintain/change the aircraft
attitude according to his/her intentions and inputs; the characteristics that govern the ease and precision in which control
can be exerted are named handling qualities [14]. Naturally, therefore, control and handling qualities are intimately
3
linked and the mechanisms used to evaluate the handling qualities of an aircraft go through the observation of the
vehicle’s control features, being that exactly what the Cooper-Harper scale does.
Essentially, the mechanism is a 10-point scale arranged in the form of dichotomous decisions whose ratings reflect
the human pilot evaluation about the aircraft handling qualities based on the binomial performance-workload in the
context of a given task . Performance refers to the precision of aircraft control, being it separated in two levels (to wit,
adequate and desired, meanwhile workload consists of the measure of how much effort, mental and physical, is the
pilot supplying to attain a given level of performance within the assigned task. In fact, performance and workload are
so strongly linked that one cannot be characterised independently of the other, therefore, a separate variable, named
compensation, is used to to conceive a proper pilot assessment [14].
Fig. 2 The Cooper-Harper rating scale – adapted from [14].
Compensation intends to measure the additional pilot effort necessary to maintain a certain level of performance
in consideration of deficient aircraft characteristics, hence, the total workload to perform a given task is comprised
of the compensation plus the workload due to task itself [14, 16]. This way, pilots rate handling qualities looking at
performance and compensation, however, behind the mask, the scale translates itself into performance and workload,
the original binomial of interest. More specifically, the scale foresees two possible levels of performance, adequate
and desired, and several degrees of compensation, from "not a factor" to "maximum tolerable", thus, to the use of the
scale, for a given vehicle condition, pilots are assigned a certain task, with expected levels of performance previously
determined and, based on their perceived workload and the achieved performance during the execution of the manoeuvre,
rate the aircraft handling qualities.
Figure 2 presents the scale. In a wider look, it is possible to see (a) its decision tree structure, with the inquiries being
on the left side and the numerical ratings displayed to the right, coming accompanied by a textual description, and (b)
that ratings are grouped into four categories (or, as commonly mentioned, four levels). In a more detailed look, ratings 1
to 7 clearly show the correspondence between that given numerical rating with the pair performance-compensation,
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beyond that, ratings 8 to 10 are more delicate since they openly expose the dependence between handling qualities and
controllability; for these ratings, performance is not a factor anymore as the control of the aircraft for the task under
evaluation may be threatened, consequently making pilots turn their full attention to control the vehicle and not anymore
to reach certain performance.
In a controllability perspective, therefore, the numerical ratings may be regrouped to conceive three distinguished
categories: (i) control is not a problem, corresponding to Cooper-Harper ratings varying from 1 to 7; (ii) control is
threatened, being that a near-LOC-I condition, represented by HQRs 8 and 9 and, finally, (iii) situations in which control
is lost or, in other words, a LOC-I condition, attested by the HQR 10. This classification is of primary relevance for the
analysis of the results obtained.
It is still important to mention that, despite the ease of having the assessment of handling qualities translated into
numerical ratings through the scale, indeed, the numbers are actually just a portion of the qualitative evaluation and be
based solely on the numerical information oversimplifies the assessment. In fact, numbers do not provide details on how
and why the evaluation pilot arrive at that classification, therefore the aviators should be stimulated to provide their
objections and feelings, which may be done by a sort of "open-questionnaire", also named a comment card, consisting
of a list of items for which comments are desired and that pilots should address for every task performed [16]. Details
on the use of the Cooper-Harper scale during the experiments are provided in Section III.E.
B. The Quantitative Loss of Control Criteria
The Quantitative Loss of Control Criteria is currently the only mechanism based on quantitative variables to classify
an event as a LOC-I. It consists of a parametric analysis in which ten aircraft variables, identified as the most important
parameters for these events, are plotted in five envelopes relating to flight dynamics characteristics, flight control use
(both for pitch and roll), structural integrity and aerodynamics. Figure 3 presents the variables used to conceive the
criteria and the corresponding envelopes, which are briefly presented (details are found in [15]):
• Adverse Aerodynamics – AA – envelope: it plots the normalised angle of attack (훼푁푂푅푀 ) versus normalised
sideslip angle (훽푁푂푅푀 ). The normalisation of 훼 depends on the angle of attack that activates the stall warning
system (훼푆푊 ), meanwhile 훽 is normalised by the sideslip angle for a non-crabbed approach in the maximum
demonstrated crosswind for takeoff or landing (훽푀퐷푋푊 ). The AA envelope indicates stall conditions both in
pitch and yaw;
• Unusual Attitude – UA – envelope: it maps the pitch attitude angle (휃) versus the bank angle (휙), thus plotting
data that crew rely on most, as pilots are constantly looking at these flightpath parameters, once they are shown in
the attitude indicator. The axes limits† are -45°≤ 휙 ≤ +45° and -10°≤ 휃 ≤ +25°;
• Structural Integrity – SI – envelope: it is function of the vertical load factor (푛) and normalised airspeed
(푉푁푂푅푀 ), indicating overspeed occurrence and structural overload. Both axes are dependent on the configuration
of the aircraft, as shown in Fig. 3; the normalisation of the airspeed depends on the stall warning equivalent
airspeed in 1-g flight (푉푆푊 ) and the maximum operating equivalent airspeed for flaps-up (푉푀푂) – Equation 1 – or
flaps-down (푉퐹퐸 ) – Equation 2.
푉푁푂푅푀 =
푉퐸 −푉푆푊
푉푀푂 −푉푆푊 (1) 푉푁푂푅푀 =
푉퐸 −푉푆푊
푉퐹퐸 −푉푆푊 (2)
• Dynamic Pitch Control – DPC – envelope: it plots dynamic pitch attitude (휃’) versus pitch control percentage
usage. Dynamic pitch attitude (휃 ′) is the sum of the current pitch with the pitch rate for one second – Equation 3 –,
thus the envelope exposes consistency or opposition between pitch control commands and longitudinal aircraft
motion;
†Given the ongoing discussion by aviation authorities regarding the definition of the term usual attitude [17, 18], the metrics herein adopted
consider the values the scope proposed in [15]
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휃 ′ = 휃 + ¤휃 (3) 휙′ = 휙 + ¤휙 (4)
• Dynamic Roll Control – DRC – envelope: it is the equivalent of the DPC applied for the lateral axis, hence the
dynamic roll attitude (휙’) is the sum of the current bank angle with the roll rate for one second – Equation 4 –.
The envelope provides information whether the utilisation of roll control commands is consistent or opposed to
the lateral aircraft motion.
The bold lines in each envelope shown in Fig. 3, therefore, refers to the expected limits of that given variable in
normal flight conditions, including emergency situations foreseen in manuals; the quantitative criteria is based on the
number of envelopes crossed, i.e.: "normal operational maneuvers, even if aggressive, usually do not exceed more than
one envelope[,] a maneuver that exceeds only two envelopes is a borderline LOC-I condition [and] a maneuver that
exceeds three or more QLC envelopes can be classified as LOC-I [since it] seems to be a good working definition" [15].
It is possible to observe the number of envelopes crossed according to the same categories in which the HQRs have
been rearranged, that is: (i) control is not an issue for manoeuvres in which zero or one envelope is crossed; (ii) control
is threatened, a near-LOC-I condition, for tasks corresponding to the extrapolation of two QLC envelopes and, finally,
(iii) control is lost, a LOC-I, when three, four or five envelopes are excursed. These groups are of major importance for
the discussion of the results obtained.
Fig. 3 Parametric envelopes – adapted from [15].
III. Experimental setup and procedures
Pilot-in-the-loop simulations were performed based on procedures previously adopted in human factors experiments
and special attention was dedicated to the proper use of the Cooper-Harper rating scale aiming to reduce pilot variability
in the qualitative assessment. The number of pilots and test points were shortened due to time restrictions and also pilot
availability, given that experienced test pilots in flight test engineering evaluations are rare. Even though a thorough
statistical analysis requires more data, [19] points that six different pilots represent a good balance point between cost
and quality of the results in terms of confidence interval, the exact sample size of the experiments. In the sequence,
aspects relating to the experimental setup and adopted procedures are detailed.
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A. Apparatus
Simulations were performed on the 6DOF – Degree of Freedom – research simulator at the Sao Carlos School
of Engineering (University of Sao Paulo | EESC-USP). Inside it, the only existing seat – normally occupied by the
pilot – is surrounded by commercial controls and screens (Fig. 4b): a sidestick on the left-hand side, together with an
armrest, a pedestal (with engine throttle and flap levers, among other configurable switches) on the right side and the
rudder pedals in front of the seat, slightly downwards; a 24 inch screen emulating the aircraft panel with all necessary
information is placed on a position equivalent to a head-down display and, finally, at sight of the pilot’s eyes, a 50
inch screen displays the out-the window visual scene (Fig. 4a); a black cover "wraps" the cockpit to avoid external
influence during the simulations (Fig. 4c). Flight deck instrumentation, out-the-window view and aircraft dynamic
models are simulated through the programmable open-source software FlightGear, meanwhile the Stewart platform
motion system is electrically actuated and controlled by a PID – Proportional-Integral-Derivative – and a washout filter
programmed in the MATLAB/Simulink® environment [20]. For safety reasons, saturation limits are incorporated both
to the control algorithm and the electrical actuators, yielding in the operational system motion capabilities provided in
Table 1 (relative to the centre position of the platform).
Table 1 Platform saturation limits.
Degrees of freedom Displacement
Longitudinal -370 mm ≤ x ≤ 400 mm
Lateral -400 mm ≤ y ≤ 400 mm
Vertical -275 mm ≤ z ≤ 275 mm
Roll -15° ≤ 휙 ≤ 15°
Pitch -15° ≤ 휃 ≤ 15°
Yaw -15° ≤ 휓 ≤ 15°
B. Participants
Six different pilots, most of them currently employed by Embraer S/A, were selected to participate in the test
campaign; Table 2 summarises their individual experience and background. Despite the relatively small average flight
hours of the invited aviators, it is important to mention that the flight test engineering activity is much different than
regular commercial flights, therefore, this "small" sum of flight hours in fact shades a great experience in a variety of
handling qualities conditions, a pretty much desirable characteristic to reduce pilot variability regarding the qualitative
ratings [19], moreover, pilots were all experienced to assess handling qualities using the Cooper-Harper rating scale.
Table 2 Evaluation pilots in the experiment campaign.
Pilot Flight Hours Type Ratings
1 19000
F100; B737-200/-300/-400; MD-11;
A310; A319; A320; A330; A350
2 7500 E110; E120; E145; E170; E190; E550; L500
3 6000 E110; E120; E145; E170; E190; E550; L500
4 7500 AMX; E110; E120; E145; E170; E190; L500
5 7500
AT-26; C-95; E110; E120; E145; E170
E190; F-5; HS-125; L500
6 5800 E50P; E55P; E120; E145; E170; E190; E550
7
(a) Cockpit view | embarked screens.
(b) Cockpit view | installed controls. (c) Outside view.
Fig. 4 EESC-USP’s flight simulator.
C. Test scenarios
Air crash accidents, and even the departure to an "outside the flight envelope condition", do not happen from single
causes, rather, they are the product of a particular combination of many contributing factors of different orders [21, 22].
Based on real LOC-I accidents, [23] identified their precursors and worst-case combinations to conceive a total of sixty
LOC-I test scenarios intended to be used for research and even mitigation defences certification purposes. Considering
time frame restrictions, simulator capabilities and statistical significance, four test scenarios were selected and adapted
for the experiments‡:
• Scenario 01: this set essentially consists of a vehicle impairment precursor in the form of a single-engine failure.
Given that pilots are usually trained for OEI operations, their actuation does not figure among the contribution
factors, hence, to the simulation of this scenario, engine number 2 is simply switched off (scenario 3 from [23]);
• Scenario 02: this conjunction combines precursors of two different natures, a vehicle impairment and an
inappropriate crew response. The first comes in the form of a 75% elevator effectiveness loss, which in real-life
would be naturally followed by the application of high-gain inputs, therefore, the second precursor is simulated as
exacerbated crew actuation on controls. In terms of simulation procedures, the inappropriate pilots response factor
is addressed by incorporating gains (greater than 1) to the normal control response curves, this way conceiving the
exacerbated curves; Fig. 5 presents a comparison between normal and modified shapes§ (scenario 2 from [23] –
‡The selected scenarios cover approximately 22% of a set of 126 real LOC-I occurrences and 16% of the 6087 casualties
§The degree of change from the normal to the exacerbated curve is, in fact, arbitrary, although, it is a sufficient method to address the representation
of over-controlling inputs
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Table 3 Summary of the simulation scenarios.
Scenario
number
Summary Precursors
01 Single engine failure 100% thrust reduction in engine number 2
02
Loss of control surface
effectiveness together with
exacerbated crew inputs
Loss of 75% of the
elevator effectiveness
Exacerbated crew
control inputs
03
Unresponsive engine together
with exacerbated and
delayed crew inputs
Engine number 2 unresponsive
and locked at 50% of the
total available thrust
Exacerbated and delayed
crew control inputs
04 Icing impairment together
with delayed crew inputs
Icing accumulation:
sooner stall, control surfaces
less effective, thrust asymmetry
Delayed crew
control inputs
adapted);
• Scenario 03: this combination of precursors addresses conditions in which, again, vehicle impairments combine
with inappropriate crew actuation. In the present case, the former is represented by an unresponsive engine to
crew inputs, meanwhile the latter comes in the form of exacerbated and delayed crew inputs. For simulation
purposes, engine 2 is locked in the 50% available thrust, and the sidestick control response curve is modified
according to Fig. 5, as in Scenario 02. Finally, delayed inputs are addressed by reducing the sampling frequency
of the sidestick, thus a certain pilot input signal lingers to effectively enter the aircraft dynamics (scenarios 20 and
34 from [23] – adapted);
• Scenario 04: this set foresees icing accumulation together with inappropriate crew actuation in the form of
delayed inputs. In terms of simulation, one more time, a delay between pilot control actuation and aircraft response
is provided by reducing the sampling frequency of the sidestick, on the other hand, in which concerns ice accretion,
the aircraft model configuration file is altered to, comparatively to the original model, (i) reduce the wing and
horizontal stabiliser angles of attack corresponding to the maximum lift coefficient by 25%, (ii) reduce ailerons
deflection lift increment by 20%, meanwhile drag increment caused by the same deflection is increased of 40%,
(iii) reduce elevator lift increment by 15% and augment drag variation by 40%, (iv) reduce engine number 2
maximum available thrust by approximately 45% and delay the engine response by a factor of five. Therefore, in
the aggregate, the control surfaces of the "icing" aircraft are less effective than in normal cases, as less lift and
more drag increments are produced once they are deflected, moreover, thrust asymmetry occurs, both because of
differential maximum thrust and response time, and a stall may more easily happen¶ (scenario 25 from [23] –
adapted)
Table 3 summarises the selected test scenarios, presenting their key parameters in terms of addressed precursors.
D. Tasks and levels of performance
In order to establish even conditions for all pilots and consistent use of the Cooper-Harper rating scale, a set of
tasks was conceived to evaluate possible control issues in the selected LOC-I test scenarios. In the understanding that
controllability basically lays on (i) the capability of keeping a desired attitude and (ii) the possibility of changing the
current attitude in accordance with pilot inputs, the manoeuvres were designed aiming to evaluate these competences
being based on real-world demands, thus meaning that these are manoeuvres indeed possibly to be performed in a
normal operational environment. Furthermore, control is not suddenly lost, on the contrary, it degrades in all of the
¶The degree of change on the "normal" aircraft dynamics to conceive the "icing" model is arbitrary, however, the modifications are completely in
accordance with the proposals of [23] and are characteristic of ice accretion events
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Fig. 5 Normal and exacerbated control response curves (stick & rudder + throttle inputs).
three axes, thus, some tasks are focused on the evaluation of controllability around the longitudinal axis, meanwhile
some are more lateral-directionally demanding, still, a long-exposition manoeuvre combining inputs in all axes is also
forecast. The tasks are briefly described in Table 5 together with their associated parameters under evaluation and levels
of performance‖.
Finally, due to time limitation and human factor reasons, not every task was performed in every scenario, this way, a
greater number of pilots could participate in the research and results were less influenced by fatigue. Table 4 details the
manoeuvres according to the set of precursors and also shows that, in total, 18 test points are under analysis.
Table 4 Tasks performed in each scenario.
Tasks 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 7b
Sc. 01 × × × X X × × X ×
Sc. 02 X × X × X × X × X
Sc. 03 × × × × × × × × X
Sc. 04 X X X X X X X X X
‖Tasks 4a and 4b ask for bank angles not commonly indicated on the PFD, therefore, marks were provided to make possible the execution of
these manoeuvres
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E. Evaluation procedure
Lasting approximately a total of four to five hours including resting stops, the simulations were all conducted with
one pilot at a time and generally consisted of (i) preflight briefing; (ii) execution of the tasks and (iii) manoeuvre
debriefing and Cooper-Harper rating assignment section. For what follows, details are provided on these three separate
parts.
1. Preflight briefing
Beyond a technical section, the briefing also presented a psychological component fundamental to the success of the
simulations and to the establishment of mutual confidence between the engineer in charge of the test campaign and pilots.
Conducted in the form of a conversation, this section essentially revolved around the explicit description of the mission,
translated as (i) what pilots are required to accomplish and (ii) the conditions under which the mission is conducted [14].
This way, pilots were presented in details to the nine predicted tasks to make clear their objectives, starting and ending
points, the manoeuvres themselves, parameters under observation and tolerances defining the performance criteria
predicted by the Cooper-Harper scale.
Relatively to the conditions of the mission (item (ii)), some depend on the simulation scenarios and tasks, meanwhile
some are constant. Those constant, basically consist of the meteorological circumstances of the tests – daylight, no
clouds, no wind, no turbulence and no traffic –, the selected aircraft – a Boeing 777-200ER in direct law control mode
configured for MLW (Maximum Landing Weight) rear CG – and the manual pilot-in-the-loop control flight condition,
without the aid of autopilot systems, as well as the necessity of performing the tasks based on instrument indications
(instead of visual), because of the characteristics of the manoeuvres.
In order to address the conditions dependent on the simulation scenarios, a thorough discussion was established
with pilots to determine the predicted behaviour of the aircraft under every combination of precursors and prepare
the crewmember for the execution of the tasks, hence preventing eventual distractions caused by unknown system
characteristics. Moreover, as mentioned by [24], the discussion was also important to make pilots clear that ratings
are to be assigned to the aircraft "as is", i.e., to consider that the vehicle they are flying is ready to be produced and
delivered to costumers, thus mitigating pilots tendency to take aircraft degradation into account and assign low HQRs
because they know the vehicle is faulty and that mitigation defences in practice exist.
Concerning dependence on tasks, pilots were briefed about the aircraft configuration in each task, that is, every
manoeuvre was performed with flaps retracted and gear up, exception made for task 7b in which the aircraft was "dirty",
meaning that flaps were in the fully extended position and the landing gear locked down. Furthermore, an identical set
of the controls installed within the simulator cockpit was used to demonstrate the configuration of the switches, as well
as to familiarise aviators with the equipment. Finally, the briefing section also served to detail the Cooper-Harper rating
scale with the evaluation pilots, despite their familiarity, and clearly define the wording used on it to establish an equal
level of understanding between aviators and diminish the impact of pilot variability in the results.
2. Execution of the tasks
Prior to execution of the tasks, pilots were allowed to perform a familiarisation flight with the aircraft fully
operational to become more intimate to the simulator and aircraft behaviour; solely after stating to be comfortable,
the experiments themselves actually began. For every scenario, the engineer configured the simulation software for
the desired combination of LOC-I precursors and positioned the aircraft in the air, signalling to the pilot to assume
the controls. For what followed, the aviator was the only responsible for the control of the aircraft, being able to
familiarise her/himself with the condition of the vehicle in that given simulation scenario. When judging to be ready to
commence the execution of the tasks, the aviator was instructed to fly and stabilise the aircraft in the condition (altitude
and airspeed) corresponding to the starting point of the first manoeuvre, meanwhile s/he was remembered about what
the task consisted of. When reaching and feeling comfortable in the required condition, the aviator signalled to the
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engineer her/his readiness to begin the task (a "TOP" mark), performed the manoeuvre itself and then, in a combined
decision between engineer and pilot, stated another "TOP" mark to indicate the end of the task; pilots were still free to
decide whether they wanted or not to repeat the point. During the execution of the task (between "TOP" marks), the
engineer triggered a MATLAB® protocol to collect and record aircraft quantitative data necessary to the Cooper-Harper
classification and to the QLC. In the hypothesis of pilots being satisfied with the execution of the task, the simulator was
frozen to initiate the debriefing of manoeuvre, which culminates in the assignment of a HQR.
After debriefing the task, when the test pilot stated to be ready to proceed to another manoeuvre, the simulator
was unfrozen and s/he was instructed about the next exercise and asked to fly to the new starting point, following the
just mentioned procedure to execute the duty. Thus, in-between tasks of the same scenario, pilots were required to fly
the vehicle, which points towards the long-look evaluation technique, another important aspect to minimise intrapilot
variability [16]. In the occasion of the completion of all tasks of a certain simulation scenario, an identical procedure
was applied to the next set of contributing factors, i.e., the engineer configured the simulator for the new scenario, placed
the aircraft in the air and then asked the pilot to assume the controls for the whole sequence.
3. Manoeuvre debriefing and HQR assignment
Just after the completion of a certain task, being the simulator paused, a conversation was established between
the evaluation pilot and the engineer to discuss the manoeuvre just performed. The talk was essentially based on
the comment card conceived for the experiments (refer to Appendix A) and aimed to give pilots the opportunity to
rationalise about the characteristics encountered during the exercise, a preparation for the Cooper-Harper scale, and the
engineer the chance to better comprehend the human perception about the handling qualities of the aircraft and possible
controllability issues.
Following the comment section, pilots were invited to use the Cooper-Harper scale to give a rating for the task.
However, in turn, it meant that the engineer guided the test pilot within the assessment mechanism, i.e., the questions
foreseen in the scale were accordingly posed by the engineer to the pilot, which, in conjunction with the level of
performance information, could assign a final rating. The stiff procedure was indeed necessary and guaranteed the
utilisation of the decision tree structure of the scale (if unattended, one of the reasons for scattered ratings), as well as
conceived a thorough handling quality evaluation, since the other "half" of the scale was assured, pilots’ comments.
Following the just described procedure, both qualitative and quantitative data were gathered, being the first composed
of pilots comments and Cooper-Harper ratings, and the latter of information derived from the parametric methodology
proposed by the QLC, more specifically, the number of envelopes crossed.
IV. Results and Discussion
In this Section, respectively by the observation of Cooper-Harper ratings and number of envelopes crossed according
to the QLC, qualitative and quantitative results are given and a correlation analysis between them is conceived. In
a reduced scope of several possible statistical analysis, at this point, data are observed from the perspective of an
overall preliminary result, therefore, it is not the intend to individually look at each pilot and/or seek for differences
between them. Numerical significance is provided to the correlation analysis by the measurement, via a number called
correlation coefficient, of the strength of the relationship between the variables Cooper-Harper ratings and number of
envelopes crossed. It is relevant to mention that these are understood as ordinal variables, since both the rating scale
and the QLC establish an order and categorise their outputs, which unfolds in the fact that statistical mean and standard
deviation may not be appropriate to represent central tendency and variability of the ordinal variables, therefore, median
and interquartile range are used, instead [25]. Prior to the presentation of the results in terms of HQRs and QLC outputs,
a discussion is posed the pilots’ general perception regarding the equipment utilised and the assembly of the simulation
experiments.
13
A. Pilots’ general observations about the experiments
Prior to the realisation of the experiments themselves, a total of five pilots, with different backgrounds, were invited
to take part in the flight simulator set-up process and also to fine-tune the simulation procedure. Pilots helped to place
the sidestick, rudder pedals and engine controls in an ergonomic position within the cockpit and also to adjust their
sensitivity curves, moreover, the simulation scenes to be displayed in the screens, including the identification of the
information to be exhibited in the instrument panel, were also adjusted. Aircraft loading condition was also fine-tuned,
being the FlightGear vehicle model behaviour verified to be in accordance with pilots’ expectations regarding different
combinations of weight and CG position, fact accompanied by the motion of the simulator, which was addressed after
adjustments in the parameters of the platform PID motion controller. Still before the experiments, pilots also shared
their knowledge and experience to modify and propose tasks to be performed in the simulations, as well as to define
the performance criteria to be used in each manoeuvre, that both in consideration of a fully operational aircraft and
simulation scenarios.
In a general opinion, following the realisation of the experiments themselves, in which concerns the adopted
simulation procedures, the aviators recognised similarities with their daily practices, mainly due to the existence of a
preflight briefing explanation section and the possibility of familiarising themselves with the simulator equipment, the
test scenarios and also with the tasks. Moreover, the explanation of the Cooper-Harper scale was also positively seen by
the pilots and some attested congruence with their background knowledge, despite the recognition that sometimes the
scale is used in different ways in their routine jobs.
Regarding the simulation scenarios, the aviators usually mentioned during the preflight briefing the existence of
redundancy to mitigate some of the vehicle impairments addressed by the scenarios, especially in terms of loss of
elevator effectiveness (Scenario 02) and unresponsive engines (Scenario 03), moreover, some pilots pointed that the
modifications on the control curves performed to address exacerbated inputs (Fig. 5) sometimes led to a vehicle response
incompatible to that expected for an aircraft of the size and inertia of a Boeing 777. Despite these observations, all
pilots attested realism to the simulation scenarios and assimilated the combinations of precursors, some even elongating
the preflight briefing section to share their experiences in flight test campaigns regarding similar conditions.
Concerning the conceived tasks, the evaluation pilots attested that they would expect to perform the assigned
manoeuvres in a routine operating basis, but these are usually less demanding in normal procedures than the levels
of performance proposed in each simulation exercise. Furthermore, pilots mentioned to be indeed immersed in the
simulation environment during the realisation of the tests and felt comfortable with the simulator aircraft model response,
as well as the platform motion. It is noteworthy, however, that some pilots eventually reached the platform saturation
limits (Table 1) during the execution of a certain task and that the simulator pitch and roll maximum angles are smaller
than those understood as usual attitude borderlines and incorporated by QLC UA envelpe.
B. Cooper-Harper Ratings
The handling qualities results for the tasks performed in the piloted simulations are summarised in Fig. 6 in the form
of a box and whisker plot of the numerical ratings assigned by six different aviators. The low number of HQRs outliers
(approximately, 6%) attests the coherence of the methodology employed in the simulations in the sense of reducing pilot
variability, an impossible to remove aspect of every handling quality experiment due to differences in piloting strategies
and subjectivity of the compensation wording [19].
In an overview, Fig. 6 shows that handling qualities in Scenario 01 are usually rated Level 1 (HQRs 1 to 3), since
an OEI situation is not supposed to push flying qualities to poor conditions, furthermore, given that pilots are usually
trained for an OEI flight, there is no crew inappropriate response precursor among those of Scenario 01. The second
combination of contributing factors (Scenario 02), in turn, is typically associated with Level 2 ratings (HQRs 4 to 6),
as well as the only task performed in Scenario 03; in common, these sets share the exacerbated crew inputs LOC-I
precursor. Scenario 04, on the other hand, is more diverse as Level 2, Level 3 (HQRs 7 to 9) and even Level 4 (HQR
10) ratings are encountered, meaning that handling qualities are indeed deeply connected to the manoeuvre being
performed [14], in fact, it is attested by the fact that tasks addressing the capability of changing the aircraft longitudinal
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Fig. 6 Cooper-Harper ratings.
attitude (tasks 3a and 3b) are worse rated than those associated with the maintenance of a certain pitch condition (tasks
1a and 1b), meanwhile the opposite occurs for the lateral-axis exercises∗∗, which is probably associated with differences
in power requirements posed by the manoeuvres and the necessity of compensating yaw tendencies (bearing in mind
the degraded condition of the vehicle due to icing). Finally, the fourth set of precursors is the only combination of
precursors addressed in this research yielding to produce a LOC-I condition (HQR 10), or imminence of such (HQRs 8
and 9), in pilots’ perspective.
From the observation of manoeuvres performed in more than one set of precursors, Fig. 6 also points that, in a
general perspective, Scenarios 01 to 04 are arranged in an ascending order of pilot degree of compensation. In fact, it is
important to remember that total pilot workload is comprised of the workload due to the task itself plus the compensation,
moreover, the decision tree structure of the Cooper-Harper scale (thoroughly followed in the experiments) prioritises the
assessment of pilot workload, instead of performance criteria, thus, a same task yielding in HQRs of different Levels
according to the simulation scenario lead to the conclusion that the degree of compensation is indeed the reason for the
difference. Taking as example task 7b, a summary of pilots debriefing comments confirm it:
• Scenario 02: pitch attitude, as well as bank angle control, is fair, even though the aircraft in pitch be sluggish and,
in roll, tending towards something abrupt. Displacement of the sidesitck, both in the longitudinal and lateral axes,
is moderate, the same valid for its frequency of use. Rudder pedals are not used by the majority of pilots, and
airspeed control is somewhere in between easy and fair. No PIO tendency nor special control technique required.
Physical and mental workload varying from small to moderate;
• Scenario 03: pitch attitude and bank angle control are considered to be from fair to difficult and aircraft response,
both in pitch and roll, is sluggish, but also abrupt. Sidesitck displacements tend to be small, but its frequency of
use is high. Rudder pedals are not used and the airspeed control lies in between fair and difficult. Special control
techniques are employed aiming to avoid a possible longitudinal PIO. Localizer tracking did not pose problems,
but following the glideslope was difficult. Physical and mental workload stay between moderate to high;
∗∗That is, tasks related to the evaluation of the capability of changing the aircraft lateral attitude (tasks 4a and 4b) typically have better HQRs than
those associated with the maintenance of a bank angle condition (tasks 2a and 2b)
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• Scenario 04: both pitch attitude and bank angle control are difficult for most pilots, being the longitudinal and
lateral aircraft responses sluggish and unpredictable. Control column displacements are wide and used at a
high frequency. Pedals are eventually used and the airspeed control is difficult (some pilots even said it to be
"impossible"). Special techniques are used, as some pilots tried to compensate the delay in roll response by using
pedal inputs, meanwhile others used throttle levers asymmetry, moreover some still combined high gain and small
displacement actuation on the sidestick to avoid a severe longitudinal PIO tendency. Physical and mental workload
are high.
Finally, the encounter of HQRs corresponding to controllability thresholds or even LOC-I conditions in the simulation
experiments, states that the preliminary LOC-I test scenarios proposed in [23] and adapted for the purposes of this
research, are effective in their objective to be used for testing LOC-I conditions (that in pilots’ perspective). Beyond it,
bearing in mind that the tasks performed in the simulations are driven by real-world demands, the finding unfolds in the
fact that the presence in an operational environment of the precursors addressed by the scenarios may result in accidents,
as past events sadly attest.
C. Number of envelopes crossed – QLC
Following the parametric methodology suggested by the QLC, data of the various tasks performed by the six
different pilots were plotted accordingly (additional data required to normalise variables used by the QLC are presented
in Appendix B) to determined the number of envelopes crossed, being the results presented in Fig. 7. Again, few outliers
occur (approximately 2%), showing that the methodology consistency also reverberates in the quantitative approach,
moreover, on average, no envelopes are extrapolated in Scenarios 01 and 03, and for the sets 02 and 04, one envelope is
usually crossed, which, in turn, does not represent a category shift for the quantitative method. Figure 7 still shows
that, despite some pilots have eventually crossed two or even three envelopes, only in task 7b from Scenario 04 there is
convergence to a LOC-I borderline condition (comparatively, this is the only manoeuvre consistently rated Level 4 in
pilots’ opinion according to the Cooper-Harper scale), attesting that, in the perspective of the QLC, the test scenarios
rarely resulted in LOC-I or even near-LOC-I conditions, that both for an overall result between different pilots and even
individually looking at each aviator. Furthermore, the ascending pilot degree of compensation from Scenario 01 to 04
does not have correspondence on the QLC, as little to no difference is seen between the number of envelopes excursed
across the simulation scenarios.
In order to understand the impact of aircraft deficiencies on the parametric methodology, a more detailed investigation
shows that the only envelope excursed in Scenario 01 is the DRC and it occurred for the lateral tasks – namely, 2b and
4b –; in Scenario 02, DRC crossing occurs for the exercises majorly involving the lateral axis – 2a and 4a. The landing
approach (7b) in Scenario 03 resulted in the excursion of the DPC and AA envelopes, although not resulting in a stall;
finally, in Scenario 04, the dynamics envelopes (DPC and DRC) again represent the most common crossings, and the
correspondence between longitudinal manoeuvre and DPC extrapolation, as well as lateral-axis exercise and DRC
excursion, is valid, however, there is no significant difference between tasks evaluating the maintenance of a certain
attitude (tasks 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b) and the capability of changing the flight condition (tasks 3a, 3b, 4a and 4b).
Although not representing a difference to the quantitative criteria, the identification of the envelopes typically
crossed shows that AA, UA and SI excursions are rare and it is possibly associated to the conception of the tasks, process
partially driven by the restrictions imposed to guarantee the proper use of the Cooper-Harper rating scale. In further
details, to the qualitative assessment, pilots must be aware of the parameters and tolerances defining the performance
criteria [16], therefore, tasks were designed in a way that pilots could monitor the evolution of these parameters during
the execution of the manoeuvres and then actuate on the controls to counteract any deviations from the assigned exercise.
Due to such necessity, the variables under consideration to conceive performance (as for the scale) are essentially those
provided on the aircraft PFD – i.e., airspeed, altitude, pitch angle and bank angle – and some of these form the basis
of the UA and SI envelopes. In the perspective of these mentioned envelopes, the assigned tasks typically consists of
taking the aircraft close to their borderlines, but the achievement of the wider level of performance (adequate condition)
guarantees no excursion, given that it would be an inconsistency with a safe flight definition to consider as adequate the
excursion of usual pitch and bank attitudes, for example. Hence, by monitoring the parameters under analysis for a
given task and attaining to the adequate level of performance, pilots are automatically avoiding the extrapolation of
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Fig. 7 Number of envelopes crossed according to the QLC.
two†† of the five QLC envelopes.
D. Correlation
Following the results obtained for the Cooper-Harper ratings and number of envelopes crossed, the correlation
between them is investigated. In fact, more precisely, the analysis is conducted for the classification categories resulting
from the qualitative ratings and the amount of envelopes extrapolated, i.e., normal situations correspond to HQRs from 1
to 7, controllability threats (or near-LOC-I) to ratings 8 and 9 and, finally, HQR 10 states an indeed LOC-I; respectively,
on the QLC perspective, normality is represented by zero or one envelope crossed, near-LOC-I by two crossings and,
lastly, three or more excursions are classified as a LOC-I.
As a consequence of the category variables being ordinal, as well as the lack of indication of how such a relationship,
if any, takes place, and uncertainties surrounding the normality of data distribution, the Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient – 푟푆 coefficient – is selected as the correlation parameter. For instance, the 푟푆 coefficient assesses the
existence (or not) of a monotonic relationship between the mentioned variables, details on how the exchange takes
place (linear, exponential etc) are not provided [26]. Equation 5 refers to the calculation of the Spearman’s correlation
coefficient for data with considerable number of rank ties, being 푁 the total sample size, 푅(푥) and 푅(푦) the rankings for
푥 and 푦 data and 푅(푥) and 푅(푦) the mean ranks for 푥 and 푦 [27]; 푥 and 푦 represent, respectively, the categories resulting
from the assigned HQRs and number of envelopes crossed.
rS =
1
푁
푁Í
푖=1
((
푅(푥푖) − 푅(푥)
) (
푅(푦푖) − 푅(푦)
))
√(
1
푁
푁Í
푖=1
(
푅(푥푖) − 푅(푥)
)2) ( 1
푛
푛Í
푖=1
(
푅(푦푖) − 푅(푦)
)2) (5)
††In terms of the SI envelope, velocity extrapolation, at least
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Table 6 presents the correlation coefficient calculated in consideration of all simulation scenarios and data gathered
with the six different pilots, thus the sample size adds up to 푁 = 108; moreover, assuming a null-hypothesis that there is
no monotonic correlation (and, consequently, an alternative hypothesis that there is monotonic relationship), a 푝푣푎푙푢푒 is
calculated and also provided in Table 6.
Table 6 Spearman’s correlation coefficient, p-value and sample size for the relationship between categories
resulting from Cooper-Harper ratings and number of envelopes crossed.
All Scenarios
푟푆 coefficient +0.4682
p-value 3.23e-07
N (sample size) 108
The obtained value for the correlation coefficient (푟푆 = 0.4682) indicates that a positive correlation between the
investigated variables exists and that it is statistically significant (푝푣푎푙푢푒 = 3.23e-07, assuming a significance level of
0.01 – two-tailed); no information is provided about the type of relationship between the variables. Even though with
evidences to refuse the null-hypothesis, the relationship is considered from weak to moderate due to the magnitude
of the correlation parameter. It is relevant to observe that the calculation was based on all simulations performed
and, among these, all categories resulting from the Cooper-Harper scale and the QLC (’normal’, ’near-LOC-I’ and
’LOC-I’) are present, but the events of interest (those indeed impacting on controllability) are significantly less frequent
in both approaches, therefore, the correlation is essentially driven by events in the normality range. Figure 8 shows the
frequency of events in each of the mentioned categories resulting from the application of both methods; the dominance
of manoeuvres classified as ’normal’ is clear, independently of the approach.
Fig. 8 Frequency of events according to their controllability categories resulting from the application of the
classification methods.
The small number of near-LOC-I and LOC-I events verified in both approaches, as well as the apparent lack of
correspondence on the QLC for the growing level of compensation seen in pilots’ perceptive, may result from inherent
characteristics of the selected qualitative and quantitative methods. In the Cooper-Harper rating scale, controllability is
assessed within the task, thus, different manoeuvres performed in the same simulation scenarios, and possibly even more
representative of real-life conditions, could result in more occurrences rated 10, furthermore, despite many efforts to
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provide more objectivity to the compensation wording used in the scale, the term maximum tolerable workload, decisive
for distinctions between normal events (HQRs 1 to 7) and near-LOC-I conditions (HQRs 8 and 9) is (and will ever be in
any Cooper-Harper assessment) subjective and a source of intra and interpilot variabilities (for a same pilot, fatigue, for
example, may produce different understandings of the tolerable workload level).
Regarding the QLC, when conceiving the test scenarios, [23] points that vehicle upsets, like unusual attitudes and
stall, are common factors within the chain of events leading to a LOC-I condition, however, these are rarely seen in the
plots resulting from simulations. The conception of the tasks made difficult the occurrence of critical upsets in the
experiments, essentially because the manoeuvres were based on parameters directly impacting on the QLC, like those
conceiving the UA and SI envelopes, although, it must be pointed that the test scenarios simulate a fault vehicle (e.g.,
there is a significant loss of elevator effectiveness in Scenario 02), but these circumstances are not accounted for by
the borderlines of the envelopes, since they are conceived for a fully operational aircraft and applied as if the vehicle
presented no failures. [28] discusses about the necessity of adapting QLC borderlines to permissible flight envelopes
according to the aircraft condition and, as a consequence of incorporating these changes, it is predicted that a more
thorough correlation between the qualitative and quantitative approaches may be conceived, as near-LOC-I and LOC-I
events become statistically more representative. Finally, it is remarkable that none of the QLC envelopes suggest a
connection with pilot degree of compensation; such variable has a strong importance for the Cooper-Harper scale and
actually drives the classification procedure, therefore, metrics as pilot control deflection rates, representative of mental
pilot workload [24], should be investigated as a possible addition to the criteria.
V. Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, it is possible to attest that the correlation between human pilot perspective – by means of the Cooper-
Harper rating scale – and aircraft behaviour – using the Quantitative Loss of Control Criteria – has been conceived
following the application of a comprehensive methodology for the study of LOC-I events using pilot-in-the-loop
simulations. After performing experiments with a total of six different pilots and nine distinguished manoeuvres, both
methods yielded to produce three different possible conditions: (i) controllability was not in question; (ii) a LOC-I
borderline and; (iii) a LOC-I, however, only in pilots’ perspective these three categories are consistently present.
Still, conditions within the normality range were the most frequent in both approaches, pointing that the existence of
a positive weak to moderate correlation between the methods is not much representative due to the lack of data within the
other categories and also attesting that the test scenarios 03 and 04 were more effective to address the LOC-I issue than
sets 01 and 02. To enhance the chances of effectively reaching and observing control problems, adaptations to the set of
tasks and controllability assessment were proposed, essentially laying on (i) the suggestion of conceiving manoeuvres to
be performed by the pilots based on parameters not directly linked to a QLC envelope and (ii) the necessity of adapting
QLC borderlines according to the aircraft condition, instead of using parameters relative to a fully operational vehicle.
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that engineering intervention strategies are usually based on quantitative
metrics and strategies to mitigate LOC-I accidents inevitably go through interfering in the human-machine interaction,
thus, to the future, the incorporation by the QLC of a variable relating to pilot compensation should be investigated,
since the factor may well represent human being limitations, leveraging the findings to be used for the development of
defences capable of considering, together, two of the major participants in LOC-I events and effectively mitigate the
accident.
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Appendix
A. Pilot comment card
Figure 9 presents the comment card used during simulations. The card is a sort of "open-questionnaire", since the
questions were designed in a way to combine different qualities in a single questioning, opening the possibility to assess
pilots’ objections and their causes. The inquiries fostered pilots to consider factors of multiple orders and then conceive
a more complete analysis, moreover, it also allowed the engineer to observe whether the objectives of the experiment
were actually realised, if the terms used in the Cooper-Harper scale were accurately interpreted by the pilots and if the
proposed tasks were well-designed and clear, therefore, pilots’ answers tended to be open and long, instead of simple
"YES" or "NO". This way, the options presented after each question in Fig. 9 merely worked as guides and not as truly
accepted answers.
Fig. 9 Pilot comment card used during simulation experiments.
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B. Additional data required by the QLC
As detailed in Section II.B, the QLC requires the normalisation of the airspeed and the angles of attack and sideslip,
however, this information is not promptly available in manuals and are dependent on specific aircraft configuration.
Using similar procedures as those employed in real flight test campaigns, tests were conducted in EESC-USP’s simulator
to determine the normalisation quantities; in summary, considering the only two aircraft configurations used in the
experiments, they are presented in Table 7.
The angle of attack for stall warning activation, 훼푆푊 , was approximated as the angle corresponding to the beginning
of the prestall region, point marked by aerodynamics nonlinearities as well as a nonzero roll rate tendency [29]; 훽푀퐷푋푊 ,
on the other hand, was determined following approaches performed in the maximum manufacturer’s demonstrated
takeoff/landing crosswind component, 45 kts and, finally; the maximum operating equivalent airspeed for flaps up and
flaps down configurations (푉퐹퐸 and 푉푀푂, respectively), as well as the stall warning equivalent airspeed in 1-g flight,
were determined according to airspeed tape indications provided on the PFD.
Table 7 Parameters used to normalise QLC quantities.
Aircraft Configuration Parameter Value
Flaps retracted
LDG up
훼푆푊 12.8
훽푀퐷푋푊 7.4
푉푀푂 330
푉푆푊 200
Flaps full
LDG down
훼푆푊 12.8
훽푀퐷푋푊 7.4
푉퐹퐸 170
푉푆푊 120
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